Hardening my own Nmap web UI: the security holes I shipped, and what actually saved me

I built a web front end for an Nmap-based port scanner: a FastAPI backend, a React
dashboard, background scan jobs, a plugin system. It worked. Then I sat down and
audited it like an attacker would — and found a stack of real weaknesses, plus a
lesson in why you verify an exploit before you call it one.

This is the honest version: the holes I found, the unauthenticated-RCE chain I
thought I had, why it didn't actually fire, and the hardening I shipped anyway.

Repo: https://github.com/DipesThapa/PortScanner

This is my own project, audited and fixed by me. No third-party systems were
touched. Scanners are dual-use — only ever point one at hosts you own or are
authorised to test.

Hole 1: no authentication, anywhere

The foundation: every API route and the /ws/status WebSocket were open. No
API key, no session. The Dockerfile bound 0.0.0.0:8000 and ran as root. Anyone
who could reach the port could drive scans, hit the upload endpoint, and read
every job's logs.

api_router = APIRouter()          # no dependencies — fully open

This is the real, unambiguous problem. Everything below is only interesting
because it sat behind no auth.

Hole 2: an upload endpoint that allowlisted its own files

Deep-dive follow-up commands ran against an allowlist — good instinct. But an
upload endpoint wrote a file, chmod +x'd it, and then added it to that same
allowlist:

for item in scripts_dir.glob("*"):
    if item.is_file():
        allowed.add(str(item.absolute()))   # upload authorises itself

An allowlist any input can extend isn't an allowlist. This is a genuine design
footgun.

Hole 3: the RCE I thought I had — and why it didn't fire

Here's the chain I got excited about: the scan target flows toward Nmap's argv,
and it's subprocess.run(..., shell=False). No shell injection — but you don't
need a shell to abuse Nmap. If a target became --script=/uploaded.nse, Nmap
would load and run that NSE (Lua) script, and NSE can call os.execute. Upload a
malicious .nse (Hole 2), get Nmap to load it (target-as-flag), done. Textbook
unauthenticated RCE.

Except when I actually tested it, it didn't work — and the reasons are the
interesting part:

1. argparse blocks it. The API doesn't call Nmap directly; it builds CLI args and passes them through the CLI's argparse. A flag-shaped value in the two-token form the API uses — ["--target", "--script=/evil.nse"] — makes argparse error with "expected one argument". The flag never reaches Nmap.

   >>> p.parse_args(["--target", "--script=/tmp/evil.nse"])
   error: argument --target: expected one argument   # rejected

1. A second gate blocks the upload path. The deep-dive endpoint only runs commands that appear in the plugin's generated available_cmds (fixed templates for nmap/nuclei/testssl.sh). An uploaded script's path never lands in that set, so even though it's allowlisted, you can't invoke it.

So the "RCE" was latent, not proven — two accidental guardrails stood between
a genuinely bad design and actual code execution. That's worth saying plainly:
finding scary-looking primitives is easy; confirming they chain into a working
exploit is the actual work, and here they didn't.

Hole 4: unsafe XML parsing (a real code smell)

Bandit flagged the Nmap-XML parser using xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring
(B314) — vulnerable to XXE / entity expansion if the XML is untrusted. In the
normal scan flow Nmap generates and escapes its own XML, so it's hard to reach in
practice — but the moment you parse user-supplied XML (offline re-parsing, an
import feature), it's a real hole. Cheap to fix, so fix it.

The hardening I shipped

Even though the RCE wasn't exploitable as-shipped, every weakness was worth
closing — secure-by-design beats "technically blocked by an accident":

• Auth on everything. X-API-Key dependency on the whole API router; the WebSocket validates a token. Key from PORTSCANNER_API_KEY or generated to web_runs/.api_key (0600) on first boot — never anonymous. Constant-time compare.
• Input validation + defence in depth. Targets must match a hostname/IP/CIDR pattern and can't start with -; dangerous flags (--script, -oN, …) are rejected; and a -- sentinel goes before the target so Nmap stops parsing options regardless.
• Uploads no longer self-authorise, and upload is disabled unless an operator opts in with PORTSCANNER_ENABLE_SCRIPT_UPLOAD=1.
• defusedxml for all Nmap-XML parsing.
• Secret redaction before logs are persisted; non-root container with cap_net_raw scoped to the Nmap binary; pinned deps. Locked in with a tests/test_security.py suite and CI: pytest, Bandit, pip-audit, CodeQL.

Five things worth stealing

1. Auth is link zero. Everything else only matters relative to "who can reach it."
2. Verify the exploit before you name it. A scary primitive isn't a vulnerability until you've walked it end to end. Mine died at argparse.
3. shell=False ≠ safe — the invoked program still parses its own args. Put -- before positionals and validate anything flag-shaped anyway.
4. An allowlist inputs can extend isn't one. Don't let the thing being authorised share a writer with the authoriser.
5. Run the scanners. Bandit/CodeQL/pip-audit in CI caught the XML issue my manual review skimmed past.

Full before/after, threat model, and CI are in the repo. If I got something
wrong, open an issue — publishing the honest version is the whole point.

https://github.com/DipesThapa/PortScanner